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THE T AXMAN ON CAMPUS: How AGGRESSIVE IRS
INITIATIVES ARE INCREASING AUDIT AND
COMPLIANCE RISK FOR COLLEGES & UNIVERSITIES

William A. Bailey*

I. INTRODUCTION
In October 2008, the Internal Revenue Service sent an
unprecedented 33 page questionnaire to 400 public and private
colleges and universities requiring answers to detailed, neverbefore sought questions regarding the institutions' governance
practices and tax compliance.! Of the 400 colleges and
universities that received the questionnaire,2 thirteen did not
respond to the IRS-those institutions were met with IRS
audits.3 Of the institutions that completed the questionnaire,
more than 30 additional colleges and universities were selected
for an extensive audit examination.4 The IRS reported the
audits would be focused on abuses regarding unrelated
business taxable income and executive compensation.5 The
Service has also reported that it may open up more audit
examinations for certain colleges and universities that left
* William A. Bailey, JD, LLM., CPA, Assistant Professor, Central
Washington University.
1. Internal Revenue Serv., IRS Exempt Organizations Colleges and
Universities Compliance Project: Interim Report 1 (2010) [hereinafter Interim Report].
The questionnaire's 91 primary questions (along with scores of sub-questions) were
categoriwd into four areas: organization information, activities, endowment Funds,
and executive compensation. IRS Form 14018 Compliance Questionnaire: Colleges and
Universities (2008) [hereinafter College and University Questionnaire].
2. The IRS identified 2,402 public and private colleges and universities in the
population sample of organizations thought to be exempt under l.R.C. §501(c)(3) or
§115, including 1,752 private institutions and 650 public institutions. Questionnaires
were sent to 100 large institutions, 100 medium institutions, and 200 small
institutions. INTERIM RI,PORT, supra note 1, at 2. For category size data, see infra text
accompanying note 56.
:3. INTE]{]M REPORT, supra note 1, at 2. Another :n organizations indicated they
were in some way technically not the type of organization subject to the questionnaire.
IRS audit teams followed up on those organizations as well. !d.
1. !d. at 5.
5. !d.
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some questions unanswered.6
In May 2010, the IRS released an interim report analyzing
much of the data it had received from its College and
University Questionnaire.7 The report noted that the
questionnaire was part of a much larger compliance check by
the IRS into tax-exempt organizations. Indeed, the IRS has
been extremely active in the exempt organization area over the
past several years, culminating most notably in a vastly
reformed IRS Form 990-the annual informational return that
is required to be filed by most sizable organizations with tax
exemption under §501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code,
including most traditional colleges and universities.S The
changes in this form have significantly increased higher
education reporting burdens in recent years.
The IRS Questionnaire and its resulting IRS Interim
Report-along with the new reporting requirements under the
overhauled Form 990-provide significant insight into current
trends of IRS concern regarding higher education institutions.
Specifically, the data gathering informs colleges and
universities where the greatest IRS scrutiny will be spent in
upcoming years. Correspondingly, the information warns
colleges and universities where they are most vulnerable to
IRS audit and compliance risk.
6. Id. at 3. The recent expansion of activity by the IRS regarding colleges and
universities is unparalleled. Historically, colleges and universities have avoided
significant IRS scrutiny for two major reasons: a distracted IRS and a willingly
compliant higher education system. Throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the IRS
was concerned with newsworthy abuses surrounding tax shdters, television
evangelists, and the heyday of corporate mergers & acquisitions. Additionally, the IRS
historically devoted its limited exempt organi:wtion time and resources for offenses so
egregious as to put an organizations tax exemption at stake. Because of the inherently
educational mission of colleges and universities, exemption status was uniquely
protected-thus, the IRS had little to gain by diverting its resources to investigating
colleges and universities. In 1992, the IRS finally got around to significant examination
practices in higher education when it selected seven major universities for audit. Some
of these audits took more than three years. Information from these audits led to more
than an estimated 50 colleges and university audits throughout the 1990s. Over that
decade, the IRS developed some expertise on how colleges and universities work, and
where the high-dollar tax issues were likely to be found. In recent years, IRS energy
regarding colleges and universities has been a rapid increase in activity compared to
that undertaken in previous decades. BERTRAND M. HARlliNG, ,JR., THE TAX LAW OF
COLLEGES AND UNIVERSI'l'IES 1-3 (3d ed. 2008).
7. lN'l'ERIM REPORT, supra note 1, at i.
8. BRUCE R. HOPKINS ET AL., THE NEW FORM 990 1-2 (2009).
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The term audit risk as used in this article can be thought of
as the likelihood that the IRS will conduct an audit-a
burdensome, stressful ordeal that may end in troubling
consequences (e.g., negative publicity, discovery of noncompliance with the law, etc.). An organization is best
protected against audit risk when it avoids being an outlier in
its periodic filings with the IRS. Compliance risk, on the other
hand, is the risk that the organization has actually been
noncompliant with tax law. When the IRS discovers
noncompliance with tax law as a result of an audit, it may
assert an array of penalties-typically in the form of fines and
excise taxes (and, in egregious circumstances, the potential
revocation of tax exemption status-putting the entire mission
of the organization at risk). An organization is best protected
against compliance risk by understanding and meeting tax law
requirements and seeking competent, expert advice. Of course,
audit risk leads to compliance risk.
The purpose of this article is to review recent IRS interest
in colleges and universities so that higher education
institutions and their advisors can consider ways to reduce
audit and compliance risk in the elevated atmosphere of
scrutiny in years ahead. The reduction of audit and compliance
risk allows institutions of higher education to continue
unimpeded in sustaining and maintaining their central
missions of educating students and research.
This article investigates shifts in IRS behavior that will
increase audit and compliance risk at colleges and universities
for the foreseeable future. It begins in Part II by discussing the
policies driving the IRS in its strategic focus on tax exempt
organizations in general and colleges and universities in
particular-especially in regard to its new governance
monitoring practices. Part III discusses areas of IRS interest
specific to colleges and universities as highlighted by the IRS
Interim Report on higher education, and discusses subject
matter colleges and universities should consider as they
prepare for increased IRS scrutiny. Part IV discusses academic
criticisms of the IRS in its aggressive activity toward
nonprofits and colleges and universities-specifically concerns
over increased compliance costs, concerns that the IRS is
overstepping its statutorily and judicially defined audit
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authority boundaries, and concerns that the IRS is
overstepping constitutional bounds by participating in stealth
preemption. Part V offers a conclusion.

II. BACKGROUND ON INCREASED ACTIVITY IN NONPROFIT
SECTOR

A. Scandals Lead to Calls for Oversight

Current IRS activity in the nonprofit sector has its roots in
scandal. The College and University Compliance Project-the
project that prompted the
College and University
Questionnaire-is part of a larger effort by the IRS to
dramatically correct perceived management abuses believed to
have seeped from the for-profit sector into the nonprofit sector.9
Former Commissioner Everson stated in a 2005 speech that
three major factors were contributing to emerging problems in
the tax-exempt sector at the time: "a dramatic increase in the
size and complexity" of the nonprofit sector, a simultaneous
decline in IRS resources to administer the tax law, and "lax
attitudes" in organization governance.lO Commissioner
Everson's concerns were not without at least anecdotal
evidence-between 2001 and 2004, scandals emerged at several
iconic nonprofits including: the United Way, the American Red
Cross, and the Nature Conservatory.ll Everson's proposed
means to solve abuse included a focus on transparency, inter-

9. Mark W. Everson, Comm'r of Internal l{evenue, Remarks at the Greater
Washington Society of CPAs (Dec. 14, 2005) ("[T]he twin cancers of technical
manipulation and outright abuse that we saw develop some years ago in the profitmaking sector of the economy are now spreading to parts of the non-proflt sector.").
10. Id. at 4. A fourth factor Commissioner I~verson discussed in his speech at the
time was "abusive tax avoidance transactions generally, including a number that
involve tax exempts."
11. Roger Colinvaux, Charity in the 21'1 Century: Trending Toward Decay, 11
FLA. TAX REV. 1, 20 (2011). "The concerns about charities [in the flrst half of the 2000s]
surfaced largely through press reports and are legion: spending of earmarked
contributions for non-earmarked purposes; excess compensation to organization
insiders; mission drift-deliberate, or aided hy faulty corporate governance; acceptance
of property contributions when donors or others are the principal beneflciaries;
participation in illicit tax shelter transactions; spending for non·charitable purposes;
accumulations of income; failure to provide charitable services; use of the charitable
form for non-charitable purposes; questionable investment practices; participation in
political campaigns; and self-dealing transactions, to name a few." !d. at :3.
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agency sharing of information, and intermediate sanctions.12

B. Oversight Leads to Higher Reporting Burdens in Nonprofit
Sector
In the mid and late 2000s, the IRS shift to make nonprofits
more transparent was significant. IRS focus on transparency
mushroomed into its so-called "governance initiative"-a range
of actions taken by the IRS that now scrutinize the way taxexempt organizations are governed.13 Beginning with the 2008
tax year, and phased in over three years, the IRS issued a new
version of IRS Form 990 (the annual informational return for
most sizeable public charity tax exempt organizations,
including colleges and universities).14 The changes were the
form's most significant revisions since 1979.15 Former chair of
the American Bar Association's Committee on Exempt
Organizations wrote that "[t]he promulgation of this return is
one of the most extraordinary developments affecting the
nonprofit community in recent times;"16 and "[t]he revised
Form 990 is no mere government form; the issuance of the
redesigned Form 990 is akin to publication of a mammoth set
of regulations .... In the context of nonprofit law, there has

12. Everson, supra note 9, at 12. The blunt instrument of tax-exemption
revocation has been considered too harsh a penalty in many abusive situations
involving nonprofits. Everson advocated other means by which to prevent abuse (in
addition to tax exempt status revocation). For a discussion of intermediate sanctions
see infra Parts III.i\, lll.C.1.
13. James .J. Fishman, Stealth Preemption: The IRS's Nonprofit Corporate
Governance Initiative, 29 VA. TAX REV. 545, 546-49 (201 0).
11. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., BACKGROUND PAPER: SUMMARY OF FORM 990
REDESH1N PROCESS 1 (Aug. 19, 2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/publirstege/ summary_form_ 990_redesign_process. pdf.
15. /d. For a brief history of the evolution of the Form 990, see James J.
Fishman, Commentary: The Federalization of Nonprofit Regulation and Its Discontents,
99 KY. L.•J. 799, 799-tlO:) (2010-11) ("In 1912, the Treasury Department required all
tax-exempt organizations to file an annual information return, a two-page form that
covered the 1941 tax year and consisted of three questions, an income statement, and a
balance sheet .... No one could have imagined from such a modest beginning that
Form 990 would exponentially expand in page-length and importance to become the
principal disclosure tool for government oversight of exempt organizations."). For a
more expanded history of disclosure forms for tax-exempt organizations, see generally
MARION FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND
STATE LAW AND REGULATION (2001).
16. HOPKINS ET AL., supra note 8, at xxi.
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never been anything like it."17
The
revamped
Form
990
requires
tax-exempt
organizations-including colleges and universities-to now
report a variety of organization practices never before required,
including significant information about compensation policies,
independence of board members, conflict of interest policies,
whistleblower and document retention policies, governing
board minutes, and investment policies.18 In addition to vast
new requirements regarding the reporting of governance
information, the overhauled Form 990 also reqmres
significantly more information concerning compensation of
highly paid employees.19
In general, the reaction by the nonprofit sector to the
increased reporting requirements has been mixed. In a June
2009 speech, IRS Tax Exempt and Government Entities
Commissioner Sarah Ingram admitted as much, noting "[t]he
tax-exempt sector has had a variety of reactions to our efforts,
which is to be expected when our community engages in an
important conversation. Some have welcomed our involvement,
and some have suggested we mind our own business ....
Overall the reaction has been cautious."20

C. IRS Defends its Increasingly Active Role
Of course, the IRS sees its expanding role as imperative to
the health of the nonprofit sector. IRS Commissioner Douglas
Shulman stated in a November 2008 speech:
I know that [the nonprofit] sector has had its encounters with
abuse and misuse. The combination of tax-exemption and the
over $3 trillion of assets held by nonprofits seems too

17. BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS xxxiii (lOth ed.
2011) ("Despite its size, complexity, and overreaching, this return [the revamped Form
990] is a work of art .... [T]his return entails considerable lawyering. The revised
Form 990 is no mere government form; the issuance of the redesigned Form 990 is akin
to publication of a mammoth set of regulations. Much new 'law' is embedded in this
return.").
18. William A. Bailey, Navigating Form 990's Governance Section to Reduce a
Nonprofit's Risk Exposure, 88 PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES 4, 6-12 (2012).
19. See HOPKINS et al., supra note 8, at 89.
20. Sarah Hall Ingram, IRS Tax Exempt and Gov't Entities Comm'r, Remarks
before the Georgetown University Law Center Continuing Legal Education (.June 28,

2009).
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compelling a prize to resist for some. The IRS has fought hard
to protect the sector against corruption, and the diversion of
tax-exemption's public purposes to mere private benefit. We
will continue to insist that the sector be squeaky clean, and
that the high ideal of public benefit that underlies taxexemption is honored.21

Intertwining the mission of nonprofit sector protection with
the monitoring of governance practices, former Comptroller
General of the United States David Walker explained: "Good
governance and transparency are essential elements to ensure
that tax-exempt entities operate with integrity and
effectiveness in carrying out their missions .... Transparency
sheds light on entities' practices, which enhances incentives for
ethical, efficient, and effective operations and facilitates
oversight by the public and others."22 Former IRS
Commissioner of Tax Exempt and Government Entities Steven
Miller additionally explained the intent of the governance
questions:
[T]o let the sun shine on governance practices. Let the public
see how your organization is run [and] what standard of
conduct you desire and aspire to. . . . We care about
governance because we believe. . . that a well-governed
organization is more likely to be compliant with the tax law,
while poor governance can easily lead to trouble. Good
governance also allows organizations to self-identify and selfresolve problems.23

These statements echo the strongest argument the IRS has
maintained in broadening its tax compliance mission from tax
law enforcement to monitoring governance practices-its
position that a better governed organization is more likely to be
compliant with tax law.24 The argument may be vulnerable,
21. Douglas Shulman, Comm'r of Internal Revenue, Remarks before
Independent Sector (Nov. 10, 2008).
22. Tax·Exempt Sector: Governance, Transparency, and Oversight Are Critical
for Maintaining Public Trust: Testimony Before the House Comm 'n On Ways and
Means, 109th Cong. 4 (2005) (statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller General of
the U.S.).
2:3. Steven T. Miller, Comm'r, Tax Exempt and Gov't Entities Div. of the
Internal Revenue Serv., Remarks at the Western Conference on Exempt Organi?:ations:
Nonprofit Governance 3 (Nov. 20, 2008) (emphasis added).
24. HOPKINS, supra note 17, at 140.
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however, as critics have argued that (1) the IRS has
overreached its audit authority by unprecedentedly going
beyond the enforcement of actual tax compliance to the realm
of enforcing the means by which taxpayers perform tax
compliance, and (2) without congressionally mandated statute,
the IRS has overreached its constitutional authority under
principles of preemption. Both criticisms are discussed in Part
IV below.
The IRS has clearly seen results from flexing its audit
power muscle in the area of nonprofit governance. As word
spread that the IRS would require organizations to report on
governance procedures beginning in 2008, accounting firm
Grant Thornton conducted a 2008 survey25 where 652
nonprofit officers indicated:
26% created governance policies for the first time in the
prevwus year
71% reported having annual meetings to discuss executive
compensation
72% had a board or committee review the Form 990 (up from
40% in the previous year), and
92% had a written conflict of interest policy (up from 62%
three years previously).

Colleges and Universities should be particularly aware of
the new governance policy and practice issues addressed by the
Form 990. As many nonprofit organizations are increasingly
seeking to make their organizations transparent, those that fail
to implement such procedures are likely to become outliers in a
stream of IRS data, thereby increasing their risk of IRS audit.

D. Governance Initiatives Turn Focus to Hospitals & Higher
Education
Although the new governance and other reporting burdens
have been applied across all areas of the nonprofit sector by
means of the Form 990 Annual Return, the IRS has moved to a
phase of focusing further scrutiny on specific groups within the
tax-exempt sector: hospitals and higher education.

25.

Ingram, supra note 20.
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In May, 2006, questionnaires were sent to more than 500
nonprofit hospitals. The two principal purposes of the
questionnaire were to (1) determine "whether and how
nonprofit hospitals demonstrate their qualification for
exemption as organizations described in section 501(c)(3) under
the community benefit standard, and (2) [to] identif[y] how
hospitals establish executive compensation" so that the IRS
could end abusively high executive compensation.26
In February 2009, the IRS issued its Final Report on TaxExempt Hospitals.27 The Service concluded that tax-exempt
hospitals spent on average 9% of their revenues on community
benefit expenditures including uncompensated care, medical
education and training, research, and community programs.28
The IRS also concluded that "[n]early all hospitals in the study
reported complying with key elements of the rebuttable
presumption procedure29 available to establish compensation of
certain executives and disqualified persons."30 Thus, the IRS
found substantial compliance with rules relating to reasonable
compensation throughout the hospital sector, even though 20 of
the hospitals had been selected for detailed compensation
audits due to high compensation amounts relative to the size
and circumstances of the hospital.31 Ultimately, the IRS
indicated in its final report that compensation practices at the
20 hospitals audited were found to be reasonable under tax
law.32
Following the IRS hospital study, the Service significantly
revised its Schedule H (Schedule for Tax-Exempt Hospitals)-a
detailed schedule attached to a nonprofit hospital's Form 990.
IRS Commissioner Douglas Shulman stated: "I'm confident

26.
REPOHT 3

INTEIWAL

REVENUE SERV.,

HOSPITAL COMPLIANCE PROJECT:

INTERIM

(2007).

27. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS HOSPITAL STUDY
EXECUTIVE SUMMAIW OF FINAL REPORT 1 (2009).
28. /d. at 3; INTEHNAL REVENUE SERV., IRS EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS (TE/GE)
HOSPITAL COMPLIANCE I'RO.JF;CT FINAL REPOHT 3 (2009) [hereinafter HOSPITAL FINAL
REPOWI'j.
29.
:30.

See discussion of rebuttable presumption infra Part III.C.4.b.
HOSPITAL FINAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 5.

:31. Press Briefing, Lois Lerner, Dir. of the IRS Exempt Org., on the IRS Report
on Nonproflt Hosp. 3 (Feb 12, 2009) (on file with the author).
82. HOSPITAL FINAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 5.
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that the new hospital schedule for the Form 990-the Schedule
H-is the right tool to allow nonprofit hospitals, of all types
and sizes, to report how they promote the health of their
communities and to justify their tax exemption.":3:3 It can be
speculated that, as the IRS revamped a special schedule for
nonprofit hospitals in the wake of its hospital study, the IRS
may create a new schedule designed specifically for colleges
and universities once the Service has completed its study of
higher education.:34
The study for hospitals was more rapid and concise than
the college and university study. Within 6 months of sending
questionnaires to over 500 hospitals, the IRS sent another
batch of questionnaires to 400 universities and colleges. The
focus of IRS inquiry for Colleges and Universities was
fourfold-the IRS solicited 94 questions (with a myriad of sub
questions) in areas of (1) organization information, (2)
activities potentially unrelated to the school's education
mission (and therefore creating taxable income under the
unrelated business income rules), (3) endowment funds, and (4)
executive compensation.:35 Although the IRS issued an interim
report concerning universities and colleges in May 2010, the
study is ongoing as the IRS has yet to issue a final report.36
These developments are discussed in more detail below.

33. Shulman, supra note 21, at 2.
31. Grassley Tones Down Endowment Threats, POLITICO (Sept. 10, 2008),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0908/13310.html. '"1 would like to ask [federal
agencies] to develop a Form 990 schedule for colleges and universities,' Grassley said in
reference to the form required for tax-exempt and non-profit organizations." He added
that he wanted a specialized form to require information about 'student populations or
costs."' Id.
35. COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 1.
36. On October 6, 2011, Congressman Charles W. Boustany, Jr., Chairman of
the Subcomm. of Oversight on the U.S. House Ways and Means Comm., requested an
update from the IRS on its progress regarding the Final Report. Letter from Suhcomm.
on Oversight Chairman Charles W. Boustany to Comm'r Douglas H. Shulman (Oct. 6,
2011),
available
at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/UploadedFiles/Taxexempt.Oct_6.11_Redacted.pdf. No answer was given by the time of this printing.
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Ill. AREAS OF INCREASED SCRUTINY & RISK: SUBJECTS EITHER
FASHIONABLE OR PUNISHABLE BY NON-REVOCATION SANCTIONS

A. IRS Selection of Issues with Non-Revocation Sanctions
The four areas of IRS scrutiny in the IRS College and
University Questionnaire are telling. Traditionally, the IRS
has focused its resources in the tax-exempt organization sector
only in areas it thought prudent to use its most blunt and
effective tool-revocation of tax-exemption.37 As former IRS
Commission Everson stated, this instrument is in many ways
too blunt.38 Tax-exemption revocation is often likely to punish
the entire organization and its beneficiaries for the sins of a
mere few-the equivalent of killing a mosquito with a cannon.
Such action can lead to bad publicity for the IRS, severely
limiting its enforcement capabilities. A better strategy, clearly,
is for the IRS to cherry-pick areas of concern that allow the
Service to launch surgical strikes-imposing penalties in a
way, so to speak, that allows the punishment to fit the crime.
The areas of IRS scrutiny are apparently aimed at
circumstances in which the IRS can use finer tools-penalties
that do not consist of outright tax exemption revocation-to
punish abuse and enforce tax compliance. This is most clearly
demonstrated in the compensation area. The IRS has been
continuously concerned with high compensation among taxexempt organizations.39 In 1996, Congress passed the

:n. CONRAD TEI'I'ELL & RICHARD i\. SIEGAL, AVOIDING INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS
xiii (1998).
38. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
:39. See REPORT ON EXEMPT 0IWANIZATIONS EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
COMPLIANCE PIW.JECT-i'ARTS I AND II, at 2 (2007) ("In 2002, final section 4958
regulations were promulgated. Shortly thereafter, EO created the Intermediate
Sanctions Committee to coordinate all aspects of interpretation and enforcement of
section 1958 and the final regulations issued thereunder, including helping identify
and develop section 4958 issues. In 2001, EO formally implemented the Executive
Compensation Compliance Initiative, designed to review compensation practices of
exempt organizations to identify tax administration concerns and potential areas of
abuse in the exempt sector. The Project, which was managed by the Executive
Compensation Compliance Initiative Team, included education and outreach
components complemented by an examination program focusing on executive
compensation paid by a broad range of public charities, as well as private
foundations.").
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intermediate sanction rules under IRC §4958. 40 These rules
provide that, instead of draconianly revoking an entity's taxexempt status in cases of certain types of private inurement,
certain private inurement occurrences called "excess benefit
transactions" would impose excise taxes on an individual
benefiting improperly from the transaction.41 For example, if
an executive received unreasonably high compensation, the
portion of the compensation that was excessive is (1) taxed with
an excise tax and (2) the excess amount of compensation would
be mandatorily returned to the nonprofit organization.42 Thus,
the sanctions focus on punishing the bad actor who receives
private inurement, instead of punishing the entire organization
by revoking its tax exemption status. 43
In addition to intermediate sanctions, the IRS can also
require tax-exempt organizations like colleges and universities
to pay higher taxes if they are underreporting taxable
unrelated business income.44 The unrelated business income
("UBI") rules were enacted by Congress in 1950 with two
policies in mind: First, to discipline tax-exempt organizations
that conducted business activities unrelated to the
organization's exempt purpose (this would otherwise violate
the public benefit doctrine thereby putting the organization's
tax exemption at risk).45 Second, to place nonprofit
organizations engaging in for-profit business activity on a level
playing field with for-profit businesses engaged in the same
activity.46 The solution was to impose excise taxes on UBI. UBI
40. See also Treas. Reg. 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(l )(ii).
IRC §4958(c). For detailed background on the Intermediate Sanctions rules
under IRC §4958, see generally TEITELL & SIEGAL, supra note ::l7.
42. The excise tax is 25% of the excess benefit. For organizations that do not
report the improper transactions before the IRS finds them, the excise tax rate is 200'%
of the excess benefit. IRC §4958(a)-(b).
43. The IRS has reserved the right to revoke tax exemption of the entire
organization in cases of multiple or extremely severe cases of excess benefit
transactions. See Caracci. v. Comm'r, 118 T.C. ::379, 411-17 (2002) (rev'd on other
grounds 456 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2006). "Although the imposition of section 4958 excise
taxes as a result of an excess benefit transaction does not preclude revocation of the
organization's tax-exempt status, the legislative history indicates that both a
revocation and the imposition of intermediate sanctions will be an unusual case."
Caracci, 118 T.C. at 417.
44. See HOPKINS, supra note 17, at 634-:n.
45. ld.
46. ld. See also HARDING, supra note 6, at 10.
11.
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and the associated excise tax are reported annually on an
organization's Form 990-T Exempt Organization Business
Income Tax Return. 47
Colleges and Universities may typically engage in a variety
of activities that are potentially subject to tax under the UBI
rules; including bookstore operations; advertising income;
restaurant operations; operations of parking lots; the sale,
rental, or exchange of mailing lists; concession sales; etc. 48 It is
apparent from the College and University Questionnaire that
the IRS is concerned with the underreporting of UBI activities
on Form 990-T. This concern is likely a product of IRS
aspirations to both increase revenue and preserve fairness.
Many colleges and universities reported that they had never
filed a Form 990-T,49 so the IRS presumably wants to ensure it
is not leaving revenue on the table from colleges and
universities that do not understand their UBI obligations. In
regard to fairness, if some institutions are taxed on their
correctly reported UBI, while other institutions fail to report
UBI activities due to their failure to follow the rules, then the
tax burden is unjustly shifted to organizations that correctly
obey the law.
With the ability to assess excise taxes on excess benefit
transactions and unrelated business income, the IRS has
surgical weapons in its possession that it can use to both
increase treasury revenue and bring organizations into
compliance without overplaying their hand with the threat of
tax exemption revocation. In addition to these sanctions, the
IRS appears to be looking forward to other areas in which they
may extend their oversight under the cover of potentially
popular support: governance and endowment funds.

B. IRS Selection of Issues with Certain Popular Support
Although there are not specific sanctions in the areas of
nonprofit governance and endowment fund management at the
present time, there has been significant popular, political, and

17. INTERNAL REVENUE SE!W .• 2010 INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 990-T: EXEMPT
OIWANIZATION BUSINESS INCOME TAX RETURN 2.

supra notp 6, at 49.
supra notP 1, at 2.

48.

HARDING.

19.

INTERIM REPORT,
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scholarly discussion on the issues. The new governance
reporting requirements discussed above are the progeny of
popular calls for governance oversight in the wake of for-profit
and nonprofit scandal in the early 2000s.50 Questions on the
College and University Questionnaire include areas such as
student faculty ratio, tuition rates and discounts, and distance
learning activities-questions that appear entirely unrelated to
the tax compliance mission of the IRS (i.e., no tax statutes
require the IRS to collect information about student/faculty
ratios, or even governance for that matter). It is difficult not to
infer a political motive on the part of the IRS in this line of
questioning and information gathering, as no direct link to tax
law compliance appears forthcoming.
Additionally, endowment funds have been highly politicized
in recent years.51 During the mid-2000s, total endowment
assets at U.S. higher education institutions almost doubled in
size-from $220 billion in 2003 to $432 billion in 2007.52 As
tuition rates increased during those years, critics charged
universities with hoarding their wealth instead of using their
assets to benefit students. Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa)
spearheaded the charge suggesting "colleges with big
endowments [should] be required to pay out funds and dedicate
some of those funds to keep tuition costs in check for working
families."53 The IRS questionnaire was created and distributed
at the peak of university endowment discussion; however,
much of the fervor surrounding university endowments cooled
down in the wake of the recent recession. In 2009 alone,
university endowments suffered average losses of 18.7% of
their value.54 It remains important for colleges and universities
to prepare for the implications of IRS interest in this area,
however, as at least one commentator-discussed below50. See Fishman, supra note 13, at 516-19, 561-78.
51. Alexander M. Wolf, Note, The Problems With Payouts: Assessing the Proposal
for a Mandatory Distribution Requirement for University Endowments, 18 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 591, 596 (2011) (citing Report Card on Tax Exemptions and Incentives for
Higher Education: Pass, Fail, or Need Improvement?: Hearing Before the U.S. Senate
Comm 'non Fin., 109th Cong. 2 (2006)).
52. U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GA0-1 0-393, Postsecondary Education 10
(2010).
53. Wolf, supra note 51, at 598.
54. Jd. at 593-91.
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soundly predicts the issue will resurface in future years as the
economy recovers.55

C. Areas of Increased Scrutiny
The 2010 Interim Report on Colleges and Universities
preliminarily analyzed specific data regarding (1) organization
and governance, (2) activities subject to unrelated business
income, (3) endowment funds, and (4) compensation for high
ranking officials. In its Interim Report, the IRS classified much
of its gathered data into categories of schools based on student
body size: large (more than 15,000 students), medium (10,000
to 15,000 students), and small (under 10,000 students).56
Highlights of the data in each area are discussed below.
1. Organization and governance

The questions in the Organization and Governance section
of the College and University Questionnaire included the
following topics: asking institutions about their number of
students and student/faculty ratio, published tuition rates and
discounts offered on tuition, whether the institution had a
written conflict of interest policy for its top management
officials and whether such a policy applied to full-time faculty
as well, questions about financial statements, whether the
institution conducted distance learning activities, questions
about its foreign activities, compensation for the five highest
employees (and whether those individuals are faculty,
department heads, administrators, investment managers, or
sports coaches), a list of any and all related entities of the
institution, and whether the institution had written policies
regarding a variety of listed transactions with related and
unrelated parties.57
While some of these questions are now asked each year on
the new form 99058-such as financial information (e.g.,
revenue, expenses, assets, and liabilities), conflict of interest

55.

/d. at 592.

56.
57.
58.

INTEmM REPOJrl', supra

note 1, at 2.

COLLEm; AND UNIVERSITY Qm;STIONNAJRE, supra note 1, at 2-6.

It should be noted that the questionnaire was submitted before the new
Form 990 was introduced.
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policies for management, and related entities-other questions
such as those regarding student/faculty ratios,59 tuition
rates,60 distance education,61 and internal policies applying to
faculty appear to have no basis in tax compliance statutes and
are not reported annually. The IRS asserted in its interim
report, however, that organizations that left specific questions
unanswered in the College and University Questionnaire were
subject to follow-up audit procedures or full-blown audits.62
Some of the disparities in the data resulting from the
questions are noteworthy, and undoubtedly have been
examined closely by the IRS. While 100% of large private
colleges and universities reported having a written conflict of
interest policy, only 58% of small private colleges and
universities reported having written conflict of interest
policies.63 Additionally, while 97% of large public and private
colleges and universities made their Audited Financial
Statements available to the public, only 76% of small private
colleges and universities made their Audited Financial
Statements available to the public.64 The data suggests the IRS
may be concerned that smaller colleges and universities do not
have sufficient controls in place to prevent abuses associated
with conflicts of interest and lack of public oversight that can
lead to self-dealing, excessive compensation, questionable
investment practices, and uses of the charitable cloak for noncharitable purposes.
Additionally, the IRS noted that, of colleges and
universities that reported having one or more controlled
organizations, only 29%, 45%, and 26% of small, medium, and
large institutions, respectively, reported receiving income from

59.

Median faculty ratios were for institutions based on size were: small: 12:1;
lNTERTM REPORT, supra note 1, at 11.
60. Median in-state tuition rates for public and private notably decreased as the
size of institutions increased: small: $14,000; medium: $6,000; large: $5,600. Median
out-of-state tuition rates for public and private intuitions did not see the same trend,
although out-of-state tuition was notably higher than in-state tuition for large
institutions: small: $14,700; medium: $12,900; large: $15,300. /d. at 12.
61. Institutions that conducted distance learning activities based on size where:
small: 54%; medium: 96%; large 99%. ld. at 16.
62. ld. at 3.
63. ld. at 12.
64. ld.
medium:

17: 1; large: 18:1.
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any controlled organizations.65 The IRS stated in its report
that although there may be cases where institutions would not
have reportable income from controlled entities, the small ratio
of reported income suggested to the IRS that the
"inconsistency" would be subject to further review.66 Here, the
IRS appears to be concerned with potential abuses related to
subsidiary entities, such as off-balance sheet accounting,
underrepresentation of compensation paid to management and
directors, and underreporting of unrelated business income
that should flow to and potentially be taxed at the parent
organization.
Another important observation by the IRS was in regard to
organizations without written policies in place that governed
transactions with controlled entities. The IRS noted that,
among small and medium colleges and universities, there were
a large number of schools that had controlled entities but did
not have written policies in place in regard to dealings with
those controlled entities.67 This observation implies the IRS
will cast more scrutiny in the future on transactions between
small and medium colleges and universities and the
organizations they control.6S
A final observation in the organization and governance area
is the data concerning the requested list of five highest paid
non -officers/directors/trustees/key employees ("non -0 DTKEs").
For large institutions, 43% reported a sports coach as their
highest paid non-ODTKE, followed by 34% reporting a faculty
member as their next highest paid non-ODTKE.69 For medium
institutions, 49% reported a faculty member as their highest
paid non-ODTKE, followed by 16% reporting a faculty member

65.

ld. at 19.
66. ld.
67. ld. at 21.
68. While the IRS was not explicit in its purpose to note the lack of college and
university policy regarding controlled entities, it can be presumed the IRS is concerned
about issues such as expense allocation, reimbursement policies, and potential
unrelated business revenue flows between controlling and controlled organizations-all
of which can impact Form 990 accounting reporting generally, and unrelated business
income tax liability amounts specifically. For further background on the various issues
regarding tax-exempt organizations and their related parties, see HOPKINS, supra note
17, at 912-15.
69. INTEIUM REPORT, supra note 1, at 51.
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as their next highest paid non-ODTKE.70 For small institutions
55% reported a faculty member as their highest paid nonODTKE, followed by 19% reporting an administrator as their
next highest paid non-ODTKE. 71 For large institutions, the
data indicates that, at the very least, the IRS may be setting
the groundwork for scrutinization into compensation packages
of coaches at large universities (assuming the political will to
investigate such compensation eventually surfaces).
One of the best ways to reduce audit risk is to avoid
becoming an outlier. As colleges and universities review the
IRS responses within the interim report, and compare
themselves with their peers, they can seek to avoid being an
outlying data point and better insulate themselves from audit
risk and potentially, inadvertently attracting the curiosity of
the IRS.

2. Activities subject to unrelated business income

It is apparent from the second section of the IRS
questionnaire that the Service is concerned with the
underreporting of UBI activities on Form 990-T. As discussed
above, this concern is likely a product of IRS aspirations to
both increase revenue and preserve fairness. Many colleges and
universities reported that they had never filed a Form 990-T,
including 4% of large universities, 29% of medium universities,
and 48% of small universities. 72 The IRS clearly understands
that as it-and, on a larger scale, organizations themselvesfinds more unrelated business activities subject to tax, treasury
revenues will correspondingly increase. Another goal the IRS
implicitly highlights in its College and University
Questionnaire is fairness. The UBI rules are relatively
complex. If some institutions are taxed on their correctly
reported UBI, while other institutions fail to report UBI
activity, then the organizations actually following the rules will
pay more than their fair share of tax.
In the second section of the IRS Questionnaire, the IRS
solicited information on 4 7 activities that colleges and
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 27.
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universities might engage in that can result in unrelated
business income. n In addition to reporting whether the college
or university participated in these activities, the organization
also was required to answer multiple sub-questions regarding
each reported activity, including: whether income from the
activity was completely, partially, or not at all considered
unrelated business income; whether income from such
activities was debt financed; whether a third-party managed or
operated the activity; whether the activity created a loss in 3 of
the prior 5 years; whether the costs of each activity exceeded
$50,000 paid to non §501(c)(3) affiliates; and whether the
college or university expected the activity to yield future
profits.74
Under IRC §512, three elements are required for an activity
to be treated as an unrelated business activity: the activity
must be (1) a trade or business, (2) regularly carried on, and (3)
not substantially related to the college or university's exempt
educational purpose. 75 The trade or business requirement is
typically interpreted quite expansively such that it is atypical
for any profit-making activity to be considered a non-trade or
business activity. 76 In determining whether an activity is
regularly carried on, the IRS looks to the "frequency and
continuity" of the activity.77 The sliding scale and complexity of
the frequency and continuity standard cause the rules in this
area to continuously evolve.
Regarding the "not substantially related element,"
Bertrand M. Harding, Jr. writes that:
The taxation of nonprofit organizations is replete with
subjective facts and circumstances tests, but none perhaps so
difficult to apply as that used in determining whether an
activity is 'substantially related' to the purposes for which the
organization's tax exemption was granted. The regulations
provide that an activity will be related only if there is a
'causal relationship' between it and the organization's exempt
purposes and will be substantially related only if the causal

73.
71.
75.
76.
77.

COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 1, at

ld.
See me§§ 512(a)(l) and 513(a).
HARDING, supra note 6, at 11.
Jd. at 15.

8·13.
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relationship is a substantial one and 'contributes importantly'
to the conduct of the exempt purposes. 78
The nebulous standards in this area promise both more
guidance and more litigation. In addition to the three prong
element test under §512 for unrelated business activities, the
Internal Revenue Code has many statutory exceptions that
shield certain types of UBI from being taxed. Some of the major
exceptions include capital gain transactions; certain types of
interest, dividend, rental, and royalty income; distribution of
low-cost articles; certain research activities; certain volunteer
activities; and activities that fall under a "convenience
exception."79
Needless to say, the transactions that give rise to UBI are
many and the UBI rules are complex. The most notable point
the IRS made in its Interim Report is that more than 60% of
colleges and universities "did not rely on advice from
independent accountants or counsel for any of these
determinations concerning unrelated business income."80 It can
be presumed that the IRS sees this as an area where colleges
and universities are under-informed; thus, it may be presumed
the IRS is highly likely to amplify its scrutiny of transactions
in the UBI area in future years.

3. Endowment funds
According to the IRS, seven of the top ten largest nonprofit
organizations in 2007 were universities or related
universities.81 Much of the wealth of these higher education
78.
79.

/d. at 16 (explaining Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(2)).
See generally HARDING, supra note 6, at 18<36. For example, gains and losses
from the sale, exchange, or other disposition of property are excluded from the
computation of a college or university's unrelated business income. Most types of
interest and dividends are excluded from UBI, unless the interest or dividend income is
received from a controlled corporation or debt-financed interest income. The rental
income rules are more complex-interest and dividend income, and rental income
received from a controlled corporation or from debt-financed property is subject to UBI
tax. Royalties as UBI have been the subject of continual litigation between the IRS and
tax-exempt organizations and the rules as to UBI treatment continue to evolve. /d.
80. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 1, at 33.
81. They are in order: 1. President & Fellows of Harvard College ($6:l.3 billion);
2. Yale University ($30.8 billion); a. Stanford University ($26.7 billion); 4. Howard
Hughes Medical Institute ($21.6 billion); 5. Kaiser Foundation hospitals ($16.5 billion);
6. Princeton University ($18.4 billion); 7. Harvard Management Private Equity Corp.
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institutions comes from their endowments. An endowment is
basically a reserve fund. Harvard has the largest university
endowment ($27.6 billion), followed by Yale ($16. 7 billion) and
Princeton ($14.4 billion). In 2010, there were 62 universities
with endowments exceeding $1 billion, and 128 universities
exceeding $500 million.S2

a. Endowments enter the public discourse
As has been discussed above, total endowment assets at
U.S. higher education institutions almost doubled in size from
$220 billion in 2003 to $432 billion in 2007.83 But even as
endowments grew, so did college tuition rates. The correlation
caused commentators to criticize universities for "hoarding"
their wealth at the purported expense of poor and middleclass
students.84 Critics were concerned that universitiesbeneficiaries of public tax benefits-were more concerned about
growing wealth, then spending their investment earnings on
operations and student aid. In September 2007, the Senate
Committee on Finance held hearings that included the topic of
university endowments.85
Political discussion culminated in proposals to enact a 5%
mandatory payout each year by large university endowment

(11.9 billion); 8. Massachusetts Institute of Technology ($15.1 billion); 9. The Common
Fund for Nonprofits ($12.5 billion); and 10. Columbia University ($11.7 billion).
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., IRS STATISTICS OF INCOME: CHARITIES AND OTHER EXEMPT
ORCAN!ZATIONS
(2009),
available
at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irssoi/O 7eocharitiessna p. pdf.
82. NA'l''L Ass'N OF COLLS. AND UNTVS. BUS. OFFICERS AND COMMONFUND
INSTITUTE, U.S. AND CANADIAN INS'l'l'l'UT!ONS LISTED RY FISCAL YEAH 2010
ENDOWMENT MARKET VALUE ANIJ PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN ENDOWMENT MARKET
VALUE
FROM
FY
2009
TO
FY
2010
(2011),
available
at
http://www. nacu ho.org/ Documents/rescarch/20 1 0 N CSE_l'ublic_Tab les_Endowmen t_M
arket_ Values_Final.pdf.
83. U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, supra note 52.
81. John Hechinger, When $26 Billion Isn't Enough, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2005,
at Pl. See also Report Card on Tax Exemptions and Incentives for Higher Education:

Pass, Fail, or Need Improvement?: Hearing Before the U.S. Senate Comm'n on Fin.,
109th
Cong.
(2006)
[hereinafter
Report
Card],
available
at
http://finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/120506cg.pdf ("It appears that for too many
colleges and universities, particularly our nation's elite institutions, the response to
efforts to make college affordable has been a had triple play: big tuition increases;
expanding endowments; and now million-dollar salaries for college Presidents.").
85. Report Card, supra note 81.
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funds.86 During 2009, however, the effects of the recession saw
university and college endowments lose an average of 18.7% of
their value.87 The economic setbacks to endowments chilled
calls for the 5% mandatory payout.ss
Although the endowment payout argument has been
shelved for the time being, recent scholarship argues that the
issue is likely to return as the economy improves in time.
Alexander Wolf gives five reasons the issue is likely to return:
(1) the restoration of positive returns by endowment funds
(e.g., Harvard's endowment gained an 11% return in its 2010
fiscal year, adding $1.5 billion to its endowment fund); (2)
tuition has continued to rise at a rate that outpaces inflation,
(3) a widely cited study lays partial blame of the economic
crisis on university endowments because they added capital
and "academic credibility" to risky investment strategies; (4)
another study found that "endowments deviate from their
stated payout policy during bad times, reducing payout
rates ... ";89 and (5) recent scrutiny of for-profit education is
leading commentators to believe that more oversight of the
nonprofit education sector is forthcoming.90

b. IRS reaction to mandatory payout discussions and findings
The IRS created and issued the Endowment section of the
College and University Questionnaire during the peak of
discussion concerning the mandatory payout. By the time the
IRS issued its Interim Report in 2010 concerning the 2006 data
gathered, it admitted that "[g]iven the fluctuations in the
financial markets since 2006, the responses to certain
endowment related questions (e.g., valuation and spending

86. Wolf, supra note 51, at 591-92. Proposed floors on endowment funds that
would be affected by a mandatory payout included $500 million and $1 billion. !d.
87. Press Release, NACUBO-Commonfund Study of Endowments, Press Release
on the 2009 Endowment Study Results (Jan. 28, 2010), available at
http://www.nacubo.org/Documents/research/2009_NCSE_Press_Release.pdf.
88. Wolf, supra note 51, at 602.
89. /d. at 605 n.97 (quoting Jeffrey Brown et al., Why I Lost My Secretary: The
Effect of Endowment Shocks on University Operations 5 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research,
Working
Paper
No.
15861,
Apr.
2010),
available
at
www .nber.org/papers/w15861).
90. Wolf, supra note 51, at 603-05. For a vigorous defense of why the mandatory
payout should not be implemented, see id. at 605-22.

2)

THE TAXMAN ON CAMPUS

237

practices) may be significantly different than if based on a
more recent year."91 Notwithstanding the dated information, a
few findings are relevant going forward, particularly if the
issue returns as Mr. Wolf predicts.
Areas of questioning in the Endowment section of the IRS
Questionnaire included inquiries regarding endowment assets
per student ratio, the implementation of target spending rates
(i.e, what percentage of the endowment assets were targeted to
be spent each year), whether the organization met its target
rate, investment policies in place, use of investment
committees, use of outside consultants, compensation of
investment managers, a diversification breakdown of fund
assets (i.e., what percentage of the funds fell into each of the
following categories: equity funds, real estate, international
funds, fixed income funds, cash, or alternative investments
(e.g., hedge funds, private equity, venture capital, etc.)), what
rate of return was expected (i.e., a metric of how much risk the
fund managers tolerated), and whether donor restrictions on
donated assets to the endowment funds were respected and
monitored.92
Noteworthy findings by the IRS in its Interim Report
included the ratio of endowment fund assets to full-time
equivalent students: large universities had an average of
$66,000 per student, but a median of a mere $7,000 per
student.93 The discrepancy suggests that there is significant
disparity in the asset size in endowment funds among large
universities-specifically, these numbers suggest a minority
segment of large universities have extremely large endowment
funds-per-student in relation to most other universities in the
large category.94

91. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 1 at 34.
92. COLLEm; AND UNIVEitSlTY QUESTIONNAIHE, supra note 1, at 20-21. The
revisl'd Form 990 does ask several annual questions regarding college and university
endowment funds including whether the organization has an endowment fund, Form
990, Part IV, beginning and ending balances of the endowment fund for current and
previous years, and a description of intended uses of the endowment fund, Form 990
Schedule D, Part V.
9::3. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 1, at 38.
91. Medium and small institutions' average asset/student ratios are $31,000 and
$56,000 per student, respectively, and median asset/student ratios are $14,000 and
$5,000 per student, respectively. /d.
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Additionally, between 95% and 100% of colleges and
universities from each category reported that they made
distributions for scholarships, awards, grants and/or loans from
their endowment funds. 95 Thus, it is evident that most colleges
and universities do use endowments to aid students, although,
neither the questions nor the IRS Interim Report indicated the
portion or amount of endowment expenses that actually went
to student aid.
Probably the most politically poignant finding by the IRS in
its Interim Report was the target spending rate reported and
the percentage of organizations that met their self-imposed
targeted spending rate. The median target spending rates set
by higher education institutions (the percentage of assets the
organizations attempt to spend out of their endowments each
year) were reported at an average of 4.8% for large institutions,
5.0% for medium institutions, and 5.0% for small institutions.96
The percentage of organizations that met their target spending
rate above for 2006 (before the economic crisis) was 89% for
large institutions, 92% for medium institutions, and 89% for
small institutions.97 In other words, the vast majority of
organizations-including large universities-were already
essentially meeting a near 5% payout anyway, without
Congressional or IRS mandate.

c. Arguments surface discouraging mandatory payout
Although more empirical data over non-recession years
would be beneficial, the IRS preliminary 2006 payout data of
roughly 5% at most institutions, coupled with various academic
defenses offered in Alexander Wolfs article discussed above,
may cripple the argument to require mandatory payouts of
endowments. Wolfs arguments98 against the mandatory
payout include: (1) a mandatory payout would not necessarily
improve affordability across the higher education sector, but
may instead subsidize wealthy students who do not need the
subsidy, (2) wealthy universities are already generous with

95.
96.
97.
98.

Jd. at 48.
ld. at :-39.
ld.
See generally Wolf, supra note 51.
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their financial aid to underprivileged and middle class
students, (3) universities do not need additional federal
oversight since a host of watchdog groups and individuals
already police a university's use of wealth (including "students,
prospective students and their parents, faculty and staff,
alumni, donors, trustees, accrediting agencies, credit rating
agencies, the media, institutions' local communities, state
governments, and government agencies like the IRS"), (4)
proponents of the payout make a flawed comparison with
private foundations that currently require a payout (but are
fundamentally different because private foundations do not
have operations), (5) mandatory payouts would constrain a
university's ability to respond to economic fluctuations, (6) a
mandatory payout would increase risk to American higher
education's international strength, and (7) a mandatory payout
would infringe on the important purpose of free speech.99
These arguments, coupled with the IRS finding that most
large universities already spend roughly 5% of their
endowment in good years may cause efforts to impose
mandatory payouts to ultimately fade away.

4. Executive compensation
Four pillar tests for maintaining tax-exempt statuslOO
require tax-exempt organizations to: (1) be organized
exclusively for a charitable purpose, (2) be operated
primarilylOl
for
a
charitable
purpose-including the
requirement to provide public (and not private) benefits,102 (3)

99. Free speech has highly protected status at Universities. For example, ,Justice
Sandra Day O'Conner's wrote in 2003: "[E]xpansive freedoms of speech and thought
associated with the university environment ... [make universities] a special niche in
our constitution." (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003)).
100. NICHOLAS P. CAFAIWI & JACLYN FABEAN CHERRY, TAX EXEMPT
0R(;ANIZATIONS: CASES & MATI~IUALS 113-14 (2003). See also JAMES J. FISHMAN &
STEPHEN SCHWARZ, TAXATION OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS
97-99 (2nd ed. 2006).
101. Although the statute uses the term "exclusively" when providing the
operational test, Treas. ]{eg. 1.501 (c)(3)-1 (c)(l) asserts that "exclusively" means
operated "primarily" for exempt purposes.
102. CAFAIWI & CHERRY, supra note 100, at 1-13 ("In your studies of tax-exempt
organizations do not assume that private benefit and private inurement are the same
thing. They are not. Exempt organizations that confer benefits on those in control of
the organization (an overlap of control and benefit) are in violation of the private
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not allow private inurement, and (4) meet specific limitations
on lobbying and political activities. Specifically, the private
inurement prohibition was designed "to prevent anyone in a
position to do so from siphoning off any of a charity's income or
assets for personal use."103
Historically, a single violation of private inurement would
allow the IRS to revoke tax exempt status for the entire
organization.104 However, the 1996 passage of the intermediate
sanctions rules gave the IRS an additional enforcement tool
that represented "the most dramatic and important package of
federal statutory tax law rules concerning tax-exempt
organizations since enactment of the basic statutory structure
of the exempt organizations field in 1969."105

a. Intermediate sanctions
The intermediate sanction rules impose a penalty excise tax
when the tax exempt organization engages in an "excess
benefit transaction," a transaction in which (1) a direct or
indirect economic benefit is provided to an organization insider,
and (2) the economic benefit provided exceeds the value (if any)
of consideration received by the organization.106 As discussed
above, a common excess benefit transaction would be an
executive or director that is compensated above fair market
inurement test. Those exempt organizations that confer a benefit on too small a group
of beneficiaries (independent of those who control the organization) have conferred a
private, not public, benefit and are in violation of the operational test, i.e. they are
engaging in a non-exempt activity.").
103. HARDING, supra note 6, at 2::35 (quoting GCM a9862 (Dec. 2, 1991)).
104. See, e.ft., Andote Psychiatric Ctr., Inc. v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo 1998-27:3, 76
T.C.M. 175 at *8 (1998) ("The presence of a single substantial nonexempt purpose
destroys the exemption regardless of the number or importance of the exempt
purposes."). See also HARDING, supra note 6, at 2::31 (stating that it is possible to have
tax exempt status revoked for violations of the private inurement rules, however, "it
would be quite unusual for the IRS to attempt to revoke a major educational
institution's tax-exempt status for such violations, unless there was a continuous
pattern of violations and the institution refused to change its ways or cooperate with
the ll:{S.'').
105. HOPKINS, supra note 17, at 548. See also id. at 565 n.l52 ("The lawyers for
the IRS wrote that the primary purpose of the intermediate sanctions rules is to
'require insiders who are receiving excess benefits to make their exempt organizations
whole, with the goal of keeping them operating for the benefit of the public."' (quoting
Chief Counsel Adv. Mem. 200431023)).
106. HARDING, supra note 6, at 212.
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value for his services. Although excess benefit transactions
may include excessive compensation, they may also include any
other benefit to the insider such as below-market sales, loans,
or lease transactions.107 In addition to excise tax penalties
assessed on the benefit received above market, the insider
must also correct the excess benefit by restoring the value of
the benefit back to organization, often by paying an equivalent
amount of cash back to the exempt organization. lOS
The excise tax penalties in this area of law are termed
"intermediate sanctions" because they are middle-ground
penalties-not so severe as to revoke an organization's exempt
status and not so light that the IRS simply ignores the
violation of law:
[W]hen the IRS determines that a form of private inurement
has occurred, [the assessment of excise taxes] stand between
the two extremes of the absence of action by the agency (other
than perhaps an examination and warning) and revocation of
the tax-exempt status of the organization (often with the
principal impact of harming the organization's programs and
beneficiaries) .1 09

The excise tax is 25% of the excess benefit and is levied
against the individual receiving the excess benefit-not the
organization.llO Intermediate sanctions may also require
complicit managers in the organization to pay an excise tax of
10% of the excess benefit.lll For organizations that do not
report the improper transactions before the IRS discovers
them, the excise tax rate assessed is 200% of the excess benefit
(again levied against the organization insider).112 In extreme
cases, where multiple excess benefit transactions occur within
an organization, the IRS may bypass the intermediate sanction
rules altogether and simply revoke the tax exempt status of the
entire organization.113

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
11:1.
156 F. :3d

/d.
I.R.C. §1958(1)(6); HOPKINS, supra note 17, at 565.
HOPKINS, supra note 17, at 548.
l.R.C. §4958(a)(l).
I.R.C. §1958(a)(2).
I.R.C. §1958(b).
See Caracci v. Comm'r, 118 T.C. 379, 414-17 (2002) (reu'd on other grounds
111 (5th Cir. 2006) ("Although the imposition of section 4958 excise taxes as a

242

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2012

It is important to note that state colleges and universities
that qualify for tax exemption under IRC §115 are not subject
to intermediate sanction provisiOns as the intermediate
sanctions only apply to 501(c)(3) organizations.114 The IRS has
taken the position that schools that are exempt under § 115 are
not subject to the intermediate sanction rules even if they have
also sought and obtained tax-exemption under §501(c)(3).115
Therefore, the questions related to intermediate sanctions on
the IRS College and University Questionnaire applied typically
to private colleges and universities only.

b. Rebuttable presumption of excess benefit
The analysis of whether intermediate sanctions apply in a
specific transaction necessarily pivots on whether the benefitsuch as compensation received by an officer or director-was
excessive.116 The intermediate sanction rules provide for a
"rebuttable presumption of reasonableness."l17 In other words,
result of an excess benefit transaction docs not preclude revocation of the
organization's tax-exempt status, the legislative history indicates that both a
revocation and the imposition of intermediate sanctions will he an unusual case.").
111. Temp. Treas. Reg.§ 53.4958-2(a)(1); HARDING, supra note 6, at 21:3; INTERIM
REPORT, supra note 1, at 60.
115. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 1, at 60.
116. Bertrand Harding notes that "[tjo the extent that a college or university
might encounter a private inurement problem, it will most likely arise in the context of
unreasonable compensation payments made to an officer, director, or trustee, or some
type of 'sweetheart deal' entered into between the school and one of these
individuals .... With respect to potential 'sweetheart arrangements' between colleges
and university and an officer, director, or trustee, the possibilities arc virtually endless.
They could involve rental arrangements in which a school rents property from the
individual at more than fair market value or leases property to the individual at less
than fair market value. Or they could involve loan arrangements whereby the school
loans funds to the individual at less than a fair market value interest rate or borrows
funds from an individual at greater than a fair market value interest rate. Also, if the
loan is not repaid in a timely fashion, there is the possibility of a private inurement. In
one case, a school's tax exemption was revoked, in part, because the school provided
two of its officers with interest-free and unsecured loans that, according to the court,
subjected the school to uncompensated risk for no business purposes." HARDINO, supra
note 6, at XXX. See Best Lock Corp. v. Comm'r, 31 T.C. 1217 (1959); Hev. Rul. 67-5,
1967-1 C.B. 123; John Marshall Law Sch. v. United States, 1981 WL 11168, at 3 (Ct.
Cl. 1981).
117. HOPKINS, supra note 17, at 562 n.126 (The "rebuttable presumption is not
provided for in the Internal Revenue Code; it was created by the legislative history (H.
Rep. 104-506, 101th Cong., 2d Sess. 56-57 (1996)) and is reflected in and amplified by
the regulations (Heg. § 58.4958-6).").
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organizations can get to a pseudo-safe harbor that the
compensation they pay must be presumed to be reasonable by
the courts if they meet several baseline requirements-most
importantly, the comparability data. The presumption is
rebuttable because even if the organization meets its baseline
requirements, the IRS can still prove unreasonableness if "the
IRS develops sufficient contrary evidence to rebut the probative
value of the comparability data relied on by the authorized
governing body."118 In other words, the IRS has a significantly
higher burden of proving that compensation or a benefit
received by an insider is above fair market value. Therefore,
when the organization meets the rebuttable presumption, the
IRS is less likely to pursue intermediate sanction due to the
greater resources it would require to prosecute and the higher
risk that it will lose in litigation.119
So what baseline elements must be met by the organization
to receive a presumption of reasonableness in its compensation
practices? Compensation payment (and similar transactions)
are considered reasonable-and therefore not an excise benefit
transaction subject to intermediate sanctions-if: (1) the
transaction was approved by an independent body (e.g., an
independent board of directors or trustees) to review and
establish the amount of compensation in advance of actual
payment, (2) the transaction involved use of appropriate
comparability data, and (3) the transaction involved
appropriate contemporaneous documentation of the process
used to establish the compensation amount.l20
The foregoing discussion of intermediate sanctions and
rebuttable presumption rules illuminate the motivation behind
IRS strategy in this area. The IRS is most likely to target
private colleges and universities with the following
characteristics: (1) the appearance of excessive compensation or
suspicious insider transactions, and (2) a lack of policies to
ensure the intermediate sanctions rebuttable presumption is in

118. HOPKINS, supra note 17, at 564.
119. Examples of where the IRS may still overcome the rehuttahle presumption
necessitate highly persuasive facts, such as where "the compensation data relied on by
the parties was not for functionally comparable positions or ... the disqualified person
in fact did not substantially perform the responsibilities of the position." Id.
120. /d. at 562-63; INTERIM REPORT, supra note 1, at 60 (emphasis added).
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place. Organizations fitting such a profile are clearly low
hanging fruit for the Service in its search for transactions in
which to apply intermediate sanction excise taxes. Thus, it
behooves colleges and universities to have rebuttable
presumption procedures in place.

c. IRS scrutiny of colleges & universities that lack the rebuttable
presumption
Some of the most key questions m the Executive
Compensation portion of the Colleges and Universities
Questionnaire point to the strategy mentioned above. The IRS
Interim Report itself discussed this motivation: "A principal
focus of the college and university study is to gather a better
understanding of how organizations use the rebuttable
presumption procedure and other governance practices in
setting compensation."121
Private institutions were asked whether the institutions
used "a process intended to satisfy the rebuttable presumption
procedure of [IRC §] 4958 to determine [compensation] ."122 Of
the institutions that responded, 45% of small, 29% of medium,

121. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 1, at 59-60. The report goes on to explain that
"[s]ection 4958, the intermediate sanction on excess benefit transactions, provides that
an excess benefit transaction occurs when a disqualified person (any person in a
position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs of the tax-exempt
organization) receives an economic benefit from an exempt organization that exceeds
the value of consideration received by the organization. In addition to or in lieu of
revoking the charity's tax-exempt status, section 4958 imposes an excise tax against
the disqualified person and possibly the organization manager. The section 4958
regulations provide a rebuttable presumption process that public charities may (hut
are not required to) use when establishing what appropriate compensation is for a
disqualified person [Treas. Reg. §53.4958-6]. This process involves three criteria-an
independent body to review and establish the amount of compensation in advance of
actual payment, use of appropriate comparability data to establish the compensation,
and contemporaneous documentation of the process used to establish the compensation
in the particular instance. Under the regulations, compensation determined pursuant
to a process that satisfies the rebuttable presumption requirements is presumed to he
reasonable in amount, and the IRS has the burden of proving that the compensation is
excessive for section 4958 excess benefit transaction tax purposes. If the rebuttable
presumption is not met, the burden is on the organization to prove that the
compensation is reasonable .... Public colleges and universities are not subject to the
provisions of section 4958; therefore, they were instructed not to complete this portion
of the questionnaire. To the extent public organizations responded to these questions,
their responses were not included in the results." !d. at 60.
122. Jd. at 62.
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and 38% of large institutions reported not using rebuttable
presumption procedures for any of their six highest paid
officers, directors, trustees, or key employees.123 The IRS also
asked follow-up questions regarding the specific elements of
the rebuttable presumption, documentation, approval process,
and use of comparable data.124
Documentation. The IRS asked whether the organization
had documented the basis for setting compensation for each of
the six highest paid ODTKEs.125 Over 85% of medium
institutions reported documenting the basis for setting
compensation prior to paying compensation for at least one of
their six highest paid ODTKEs.126 Approximately 74% of small
institutions reported the same.
Independent Approval Process. Over 85% of medium
institutions and 97% of small institutions reported approval of
compensation by an independent governing body for at least
one of their six highest paid ODTKEs.127
Use of Comparable Data. Only 63% of large institutions,
79% of medium institutions and 59% of small institutions
reported using an independent compensation comparability
survey when setting compensation for at least one of their six
highest paid ODTKEs.12S The IRS noted in its report that
investigating the use of comparability data in setting
compensation "is an area of continued focus for the IRS."129
Obviously, the IRS understands that a significant portion of
colleges and universities are not putting policies in place that

12:1. /d. at 6::3. "Key Employee,"' for purposes of the Questionnaire, was defined as
"an employee of the organization (other than an officer, director, or trustee) who has
responsibilities, powers or influence over the organization similar to those of officers,
directors, or trustees. Key employees include the chief management and administrative
officials of an organization (such as an executive director or chancellor). A chief
financial officer and the officer in charge of administration or program operations are
key employees if they have the authority to control the organization's activities, or its
finances." ld. at 51 n.2-1.
124. /d. at 62.
125. /d.
126. !d. at 6:3. The sample size of large institutions for this question was too small
to he reported without creating a risk that the identity of the respondents would be
revealed. /d.
127. /d. at 64.

128.
129.

/d.
ld.
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protect them from charges of excess benefit transactions for
many of their highly compensated officers, directors, and key
employees.
Additionally, in its scrutiny of excessive compensation, the
IRS looks beyond mere base salary of these managers and
directors. The service requested information on 22 non-salary
types of compensation in its Questionnaire.130 The most
commonly reported non-salary types of compensation included
contributions to employee benefit plans; contributions to life,
disability, and long-term care insurance; the value of
organization provided housing and utilities; and personal use of
organization vehicles.l31
It is clear the IRS is keenly interested in the compensation
of highly paid college and university individuals. This focus
should alert colleges and universities to the importance of
understanding the intricacies of the intermediate sanctions
rules as they set compensation for their highest paid personnel.
A leading scholar and practitioner in the field recently
predicted:
The coming . . . years will bring interpretations and
amplifications of the intermediate sanctions rules, with
emphasis on what does and does not constitute an excess
benefit transaction . . . . [T]his process will draw heavily on
existing law as shaped by the private inurement doctrine ....
The intermediate sanctions rules probably will be invoked
more frequently than revocation of tax-exempt status by
application of the private inurement doctrine to public

130. Aside from an individual's base salary, the IRS requested whether the IRS
paid the following types of compensation to at least one of its six highest paid ODTKEs:
bonuses, contributions to employee benefit plans, incentives, contributions to life,
disability, and long-term care insurance, split-dollar life insurance, forgiveness of debt
or interest on loans or credit extensions, stock or stock options, severance or change of
control payments, personal use of organization credit cards, personal use of
organization vehicles, personal travel for the person or family members, expense
reimbursement under non-accountable plans, value of organization provided housing
and utilities, value of organization provided vacation home, personal services provided
at person's residence (e.g., housekeeper, lawn service, etc.), other personal services
provided, health or social club dues, personal use of organization owned aircraft or
boat, first-class travel, taxable scholarship and fellowship grants, other (non-IRC §132)
fringe benefits, and any other form of compensation. Id. at 57.
131. Id.
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charities .... 1:32

Colleges and universities should continue to improve their
vigilance of tax and governance issues in the years ahead. They
will be most efficient in that process by anticipating the
direction and focus of the IRS in its monitoring and
enforcement activities discussed above. Such anticipation will
thereby allow colleges and universities to reduce compliance
risk by avoiding IRS-imposed intermediate sanction excise
taxes and defending its treatment of its potentially unrelated
business income activities. Additionally, colleges and
universities will also be able to reduce audit risk by
implementing,
improving,
and
reviewing
specifically
scrutinized governance policies and practices.
IV. CRITICISM OF EXPANDED IRS ACTIVITY
Critics of recent increased IRS activity in the nonprofit
sector note three overarching concerns: (A) an increased
compliance costs for tax-exempt organizations, (B) the IRS
exceeding its statutory and judicial boundaries of audit
authority, and (C) constitutional concerns over stealth
preemption resulting from unilateral IRS action. Most of these
concerns address new reporting burdens about governance
policies and practices for tax-exempt organizations generally;
however, these concerns also apply specifically to higher
education institutions.
A. Compliance Cost Concern

Higher reporting burdens place strain on already scarce
charitable organization resources-resources that would
otherwise help public beneficiaries of the charity. Areas
requiring the greatest burden are the resources that nonprofit
organizations-including colleges and universities-must
spend on changes to the new Form 990. Because of the many
changes on the form introduced in 2008, the IRS phased the
form in over three years.l33 Nonprofit scholar James J.
Fishman notes that:
1:32. THOMAS K. HYATT & BRUCE H. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT
H F:ALTHCARE 0RCANIZATIONS 119 (8d ed., 2008).
13il. Fishman, supra note 1 il, at 561 (201 0).
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One should not forget that disclosure comes with a cost to
comply with new demands, borne by the organization. Every
additional cost in time and money diverts the organization's
human and financial resources away from achieving its
charitable mission .... The Form 990 ... has morphed into a
legal, fundraising and public relations statement that
requires professional assistance from lawyers, development
advisors, and public relations personnel [thereby distorting
an organization's charitable energy].l34
Notably, the 2007 Form 990 Instructions estimated that the
typical reporting burden for Form 990 and its schedules
(including record keeping, learning about the law or form,
preparing the form, etc.) took 261.4 hours to complete.l35 The
instructions to the 2008, 2009, and 2010 Forms 990 and their
accompanying schedules estimated a typical reporting burden
of 497.4 hours for the same activities.l36 Clearly, the cost of
compliance is diverting resources from charitable purposes.
The IRS argues that this burden is justified in the name of
transparency and public confidence. Some scholars dispute
whether empirical evidence agrees with the IRS' bureaucratic
approach.l37 Ultimately, in the absence of congressional or
judicial oversight, the IRS will continue to prevail in its
justified burden argument.

B. IRS Exceeding Statutory and Judicial Boundaries of Audit
Authority Concern
The second concern involves the method by which the IRS
asserts its authority to request certain information such as its
governance questions on the Form 990, or the governance and
endowment questions on the IRS College and University
Questionnaire. Many of the Form 990's new governance
questions are not required by statute by the IRS's own

134. Id. at 589.
135. 2007 IRS Instructions for Form 990 and Form 990-EZ, at 65.
136. 2008 Instructions for Form 990 Return of Organization Exempt From
Income Tax, at 40; 2009 Instructions for Form 990 Return of Organization Exempt
From Income Tax, at 42; 2010 Instructions for Form 990 Return of Organization
Exempt From Income Tax, at 16.
137. Fishman, supra note 13, at 572; Kathleen M. Boozang, Does an Independent
Board Improve Nonprofit Corporate Governance?, 75 TENN. L. REV. 8:3, 1:l6 (2007).
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admission.138 Nor was a statute created allowing the IRS to
ask questions concerning governance and endowment funds on
its Questionnaire. But organizations that failed to fully
complete the Questionnaire were referred for audit by the
IRS.1:39
Additionally, the Form 990 Instructions state that its
governance section must be filled out in its entirety for the
form to be considered complete and accurate.140 When an
organization's executive signs the return, she signs under
penalties of perjury that the return is complete and
accurate.141 Thus, if any questions in the governance section
are left unanswered by an exempt organization-including
colleges and universities-the return is deemed incomplete and
the signer would presumably be subject to perjury penalties.
Worse, the failure to file a complete and accurate informational
return can also lead to tax-exempt status revocation for the
entire organization as a violation of IRC §6033(b), which
requires most tax-exempt organizations to file information "the
Secretary may by forms or regulations prescribe."142 Clearly,
1::38. 2008 Form 990, 6. The title of Page 6 of the Form 990 states: "Governance,
Management, and Disclosure (Sections A, B, and C request information about policies
not required by the Internal Revenue Code.") Notably, the parenthetical letting tax
filers know the governance section questions are not required by the Internal Revenue
Code was removed from the main heading and moved to a wbheading in the 2009 and
2010 versions of Form 990. On September 8, 2011, the treasury department issued
finalized regulations it reported as necessary to implement the redesigned Form 990.
T.D. 9519, Returns by Exempt Organizations-Revised Form 990. Although the
finalized regulations address many areas of the form that have changed in recent
years, including reporting issues concerning compensation, the finalized regulations do
not specifically address the governance section of the Form 990.
1:19. INTEI\IM REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.
110. 2010 Instructions for Form 990 Return of Organization Exempt From
Income Tax, 18 ("Although federal tax law generally does not mandate particular
management structures, operational policies, or administrative practices, every
organization is required to answer each question in Part VI. For example, all
organizations must answer lines 11 and 11a, which ask about the organization's
process, if any, it uses to review Form 990, even though the governing body is not
required by federal tax law to review Form 990.") (emphasis added).
141. The officer's signature block for the Form 990 states: "Under penalties of
perjury, l declare that I have examined this return, including accompanying schedules
and statements, and to the best of my knowledge and belief, it is true, correct, and
complete." 2010 Form 990, at 1 (emphasis added).
112. IHC §60::J:1(b). See also Rev. Rul. 59-95, 1959-1 CB 627 (holding that the
"failure or inability to file the required information return or otherwise to comply with
the provision[sj of section 60il:l of the Code and the regulations which implement it,
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the IRS is extending its audit power to solicit new information
from colleges and universities that does not have a direct basis
in statute.

1. IRS audit power authority
The IRS has broad authority to request information in
determining tax liability of an organization-but the authority
does have limits. IRC §7602(a)(l)-(2) authorizes the IRS "[t]o
examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may
be relevant or material to such inquiry" and to summon
individuals to produce such materials. A check on this power is
given in IRC §7605(b), which provides that "[n]o taxpayer shall
be subjected to unnecessary examination or investigations."
Commentary by Marcus Owens notes that the IRS is acutely
aware that at some point there is a limit on its ability to compel
information.l43 Owens notes two areas where analysis of the
limit has surfaced: summons enforcement and incomplete
return penalties.l44
Regarding summons enforcement, the courts have at times
refused to enforce summonses against taxpayers on the basis of
irrelevance under U.S. v. Powell.l45 The Powell rule requires
that the IRS must demonstrate "that the information requested
'may be relevant' or 'may shed light on' a potential tax
liability."l46 Owens concludes that a charity's governance
policies and procedures do not appear to meet the Powell
requirement of relevancy to a potential tax liability.l47
Additionally, two General Counsel Memoranda ('GCM")
addressing limits on IRS information gathering power are
telling and discussed below.

may result in the termination of the exempt status of an organization previously held
exempt, on the grounds that the organization has not established that it is observing
the conditions required for the continuation of an exempt status.").
113. Marcus S. Owens, Charities and Governance: Is the IRS Subject to
Challenge?, 119 Tax Notes 613 (2008).
141. /d.
145. 379 U.S. 18, 57-58 (1961).
146. Owens, supra note 113.
147. /d.
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2. Governance questions are not necessary for the
administration of tax law

A 1975 GCM involved IRS chief counsel considering the
consequences of omission of some information by a tax-exempt
organization on its Form 990.148 The chief counsel observed:
[l]f the material required and requested, but unsupplied, in
those forms was material and thus necessary for the proper
administration of the tax laws, then any failure to include
such information on those forms, without reasonable cause,
would subject the taxpayer to the penalty provided .... It
should be pointed out that if the materiality of these items is
questioned by a taxpayer or subsequently made the subject of
litigation, the Service should be prepared to substantiate why
it considers such items to be material.149

Thus, one path that may lead to prevailing against the IRS
for the failure to answer governance questions not required by
federal statute would be an argument that they are not
material or necessary for the proper administration of the tax
laws, but are-as the IRS has recently admitted in a relevant
speech-merely an "aid" to understand principles that "derive
from the requirements for tax exemption."150 In other words,
because the governance questions are not tied directly to tax
statute, but are distant derivations of tax statute, answers to
governance questions may not be required.
3. IRC §6033 was never intended by congress to apply to
governance practices of tax-exempt organizations

A 1980 GCM indicates that IRC §6033-the section that
grants the IRS broad authority to design returns to collect
information for the "purpose of carrying out the internal
revenue laws"-was never envisioned by Congress to elicit
information from exempt organizations that might relate to a
wagering excise tax.151 By analogy, it can be argued that the
IRS, by its own admission, should construe IRC§6033 narrowly
in such a way that if Congress did not envision use of §6033 to
148.
119.
150.
151.

GCM 36506 (Dec. 8, 1975).
!d. (emphasis added).
Ingram, supra note 20, at 3 (emphasis added).
Owens, supra note 113 (quoting GCM 38382 (May 23, 1980)).
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apply to tax exempt organization governance, then the IRS
would exceed its authority by requesting such information.
Ultimately, Owens believes a clear argument can be made that
the IRS exceeded its audit authority by soliciting information
that is not required by the Internal Revenue Code: "[I]t appears
that this situation is truly unprecedented and that a
challenge ... would potentially be successful."152
IRS use of broadly granted discretion to threaten perjury
and tax-exempt status revocation in order to implement new
governance reporting-instead of administering reporting
requirements
mandated by
Congressional
statute-is
somewhat disconcerting.153 However, because of the uncertain
limit of regulatory powers granted to the IRS in this area, and
a lack of actual litigants by tax-exempt entities, the governance
questions are likely here to stay unless or until they are
actually challenged.

C. Stealth Preemption Constitutionality Concern
In addition to statutory boundary concerns regarding recent
IRS extension into the governance areas, there are
constitutional concerns as well. James Fishman argues that
IRS regulation of nonprofit corporate governance is a type of
stealth preemption that undermines the principles of the
nation's federalist system, and is "at least one degree separated
from traditional constitutional analysis."154 He remarks:
Stealth preemption refers to a process by which a federal
agency or departmental regulator supersedes state or local
officials or imposes legal rules that historically have been
matters of state law .... The question is not whether good
governance is desirable. Of course it is. But, has the Service
identified appropriate indicators of that behavior, and does
the Service have the authority and expertise to demand such

152. Owens, supra note 143, at 6. Owens also notes that "[tjhe executive branch
functions-IRS Chief Counsel, the Treasury Department, and the Office of
Management and Budget-that would traditionally operate to prevent such
overstepping by the tax administrator have not acted, whether merely out of
inattention to or perhaps in complicity with the Service's unilateral expansion of its
authority." Td. at 5.
15:). Included in the concern is the broad precedent these actions set for IRS
authority.
151. Fishman, supra note 1:1, at 519.

THE TAXMAN ON CAMPUS

2]

253

steps as it recommends?155

Fishman notes that the American political system's major
20th century development was the growth of federal power-

particularly federal administrative action-at the expense of
traditional state authority.156 He writes:
The formal theory of federalism posits that our political
system places limits on congressional action through states'
representation in Congress, and the procedural safeguards
that function through each state's constituency to restrain the
ability of the federal government to reach beyond its
powers .... Federalism provides citizens the opportunity to
make an impact on government at a local level, helping to
make it more responsive to the immediate needs and evolving
values of individual communities, and less susceptible to
bureaucratic inertia that exists on the federallevel.157

In other words, limits are constitutionally in place to check
increased federal power crowding out the ability of the
individual citizens to influence local issues and values.
The IRS has lightly addressed this concern. IRS TE/G E
Commissioner Sarah Ingram observed in a June 2009 speech
that "we wondered if [the states] might see our work as a raid
on their authority and jurisdiction, an overstepping of bounds
on our part. But by and large that did not happen."158 But
Fishman explains that the Pension Protection Act of 2006
allowed increased cooperation between state charity regulators
and the IRS, enabling state regulators to request IRS tax
information to help prosecute misconduct with fewer
resources.159 Fishman observes that "[t]his may explain the
reluctance to criticize the Service. One cannot expect [state]
attorneys general to bite the hand that feeds them
155. ld. at 519, 561. Fishman separates some areas of current IRS scrutiny from
others. He notes that questions that related din~ctly to tax compliance and ensure
compliance with the Internal Revenue Code arc appropriate, such as questions in the
Form 990 concerning excess benefit transactions. Other questions, he argues, arc
attenuated from tax law compliance, including questions concerning independence of
directors, conflicts of interest, and disclosure policies of governance practices. !d. at
567·68.
156.
157.
158.

159.

/d. at 578.
Id. at 580.
Ingram, supra note 20, at 7.
Fishman, supra note 13, at 578·88.
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evidence."160
Fishman asserts the Service's lack of concern regarding its
inappropriate preemption should not come as a surprise; he
quotes Thomas Merrill, observing:
Agencies are specialized institutions, intensely focused on the
details of the particular statutory regimes they are charged
with administering. By design and tradition, they are not
expected to ponder larger structural issues such as the
relative balance of authority between the federal and state
governments, the importance of preserving state autonomy,
the value of allowing policy to vary in accordance with local
conditions, or the systemic advantages of permitting state
experimentation with divergent approaches to social
problems.161
In other words, agencies by nature have a narrow focus:
their own policy goals trump larger issues of balanced
government. Fishman closes his stealth preemption reasoning
by noting that cases such as Chevron and Skidmore protect
agency-made rules only where the rules were either
promulgated by an applicable statute, or where the rules relied
on the agency's expertise.162 Fishman deftly points out that the
IRS itself admits that many of its governance questions on the
Form 990163-rules required under penalties of perjury and
potential revocation of exemption status-have no substantive
basis in statute. Additionally, it can be argued persuasively
that the IRS has no expertise or experience in good corporate
governance .164
Id. at 588.
Id. at 581 (quoting Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability:
'Agency Forcing' Measures, 58 Duke
L .•J. 2125, 2147 (2009)).
162. Fishman, supra note 1 a, at 5sa.s6.
16a. The IRS would also presumably admit that governance and endowment fund
questions have no substantive based in statute (although the College and Education
Questionnaire did not subject the organization's singing executives to perjury, however,
as had been mentioned above, failure to answer the questions did automatically subject
such organizations to automatic audit by the IRS-an event that potentially can open
organizations up to risk of lost exemption status).
161. Fishman, supra note 13, at 586 (arguing that any experience the IRS has in
governance is "based on anecdotal evidence or the opinions of nongovernmental
experts, rather than any empirical basis of a link between good governance and tax
compliance.").
160.

161.
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D. Looking Forward
In the face of the legal criticisms offered above, there is no
question the IRS has received substantial compliance in both
the annual Form 990 compliance area and the College and
University Questionnaire. Without litigation concerning the
merits of IRS action, or increased oversight from Congress, it is
likely the IRS will continue its unilateral quest for
transparency in the nonprofit sector generally and higher
education specifically, unbridled and without boundary beyond
its own good conscience.
In its May 2010 College and University Interim Report, the
IRS discussed its anticipation of issuing a final report that
would provide more detailed analysis on information gathered
from the College and University Questionnaire. On October 6,
2011, Congressman Boustany, Chairman of the Subcommittee
of Oversight on the U.S. House Ways and Means Committee,
requested an update from the IRS on its progress regarding the
Final Report.165 The IRS has recently reported it still
anticipates releasing a final report on Colleges and
Universities sometime after it has completed its current 30plus College and University audits; however, no firm
timeframe has been offered on when the report will be
released.166

V. CONCLUSION
College and university tax exemption benefits invite an
opening of the door for some transparency, but how wide that
door should swing is an open question. The IRS has clearly
pushed in recent years for more transparency, and, in the
absence of significant challenge, has created considerable
reporting hurdles for colleges and universities. These hurdles
increase compliance costs and amplify audit and compliance
risk.
As colleges and universities heed signals from the IRS

165. Letter from Suhcomm. on Oversight Chairman Charles W. l3oustany to
Comm'r
Douglas
H.
Shulman
(Oct.
6,
2011),
available
at
http://waysandmeans.house. gov/U ploadedFiles/Tax -exempt. Oct_ 6.ll_Redacted. pdf.
166. IRS, EXEMPT 0RGANIZA1'IONS 2011 ANNUAL REPORT & 2012 WORK PLAN 10,
available at http://www.irs.gov/puh/irs-tege/fy2012_eo_ work_plan_20ll_annrpt.pdf.
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regarding areas of future scrutiny, they will be able to reduce
audit risk by avoiding the reporting of outlying data. Avoiding
such outlying data will reduce the chances of IRS audit.
Additionally, colleges and universities can reduce their
compliance
risk-and
the
associated
penalties
of
noncompliance-as they and their advisors attain more expert
comprehension of the law itself and the policies currently
driving the discussion.

